Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 27

Issue 2

Article 6

1939

A Classification of Public Utilities--As Affected by Nebbia v. New
York
Bettie Gilbert
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Gilbert, Bettie (1939) "A Classification of Public Utilities--As Affected by Nebbia v. New York," Kentucky
Law Journal: Vol. 27: Iss. 2, Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol27/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

A CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES---AS
AFFECTED BY NEBBIA v. NEW YORK
The accepted phrase for defining a public utility is "affected
with a public interest". This has been much criticized as
being vague;' but a vague terminology is probably more desirable than a precise and exact one, as it leaves room for growth
and expansion. Our choice should not be limited to the
extremes, and it is hoped that by means of a classification a
more satisfactory test may be reached.
The determination of the public utility status is a constitutional question, involving, as it does, the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; and so the most, if not the only,
authoritative material is the language and holdings of the United
States Supreme Court. Beginning with Munn v. l inois,2 there
is an important series of cases dealing with this problem.3 They
have all followed the general doctrine that a public utility must
be a business affected with a public interest, but their interpretations of this phrase are conflicting. They may be broadly
divided into the liberal and the conservative views. After
twenty years of conservative dominance, Nebbi v. New York4
has provided much needed strength for the liberal view, leaving
the law in such a state that neither is controlling.
The most obvious thing about the conservative view is that
its chief argument and support is a reference to the past. A
certain business is private because it has always been private
and is just like other businesses which have always been private.,
The liberal view looks at each particular case with the thought
of public welfare uppermost. These views seem permanently
irreconcilable, and probably are; but it is hoped that a classification made with a particular emphasis upon them will help
to clarify the stiuation.
I See Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 430 (1927).
*294 U. S. 113 (1876).
*Munn
v. Ill., 94 U. S. 113 (1876); German Alliance Ins. Co. Y.
Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (1914); Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Ct.,
262 U. S. 522 (1923); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927);
Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil
Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262
(1932); Nebbia v. N. Y., 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
'291 U. S. 502 (1934).
1 See Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 357 (1928).
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One distinction has been made between public utilities and
private businesses which is much more definite than "affected
with a public interest". It is this: a public utility is under
the obligation to serve all, but a private business may serve whom
it pleases. 6 This distinction has been adopted by the conservatives. In the dissenting opinion to the German Alliance Insurance Ca. v. Lewis,7 Mr. Justice Lamar said:
"If the company has the discretion to insure or the right to refuse
to insure, then by the very definition of the terms, it is not a public
business."

In Tyson & Bro. v. Banton s the Court did not say it as clearly
but there is no difficulty at all in interpreting it. In attempting
to define the necessary public interest it said:
"Nor is the interest meant such as arises from the mere fact that
the public derives benefit, accommodation, ease or enjoyment from the
existence or operation of the business; and while the word has not
always been limited narrowly as strictly denoting a 'right', that
synonym more nearly than any other expresses the sense in which it
Is to be understood."

This "right" can only be the right to demand and receive
service, and so the obligation upon the business to serve all. The
statement that it has not always been so narrowly limited is
obviously referring to the insurance case decision, which does
not fall within the definition. The same statement is quoted
with approval in Ribnick v. McBride.9 Logically, this is a result
of the-public utility status rather than a reason for it, but if it is
a necessary result, it is quite useful in determining that status.
If price regulation of the insurance business makes it a public
utility and making it a public utility imposes the obligation to
serve all, there should be great hesitation about imposing the
price regulation. There are two ways of escaping this resulteither price regulation does not make a business a public utility
or all public utilities do not have to serve all.
If all public utilities are not under the obligation to serve
a
all, starting point for a classification is provided. The first
step is a division into two classes. Those in the first are under
the obligation to serve all and those in the second are not. The
first class is much the larger and subject to further division. It
@1 Wyman, Public Service Corporatfons (1911) 2, Sec. 1.
'233 U. S. 389, 429 (1914).
'273 U. S. 418, 430 (1927).
'277 U. S. 350, 355 (1928).
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is suggested that there should be three subdivisions: (1) the
historical public callings which have survived to the present
time, (2) those operating under a governmental franchise, and
(3) extensions of the historical public utilities.
The first subdivision includes common carriers, inns, ferries,
wharfs, 3 and grist mills.". The very name-historical-precludes any extension. The modern common carriers are not
extensions, because it is not the mechanism but the function which
gives them their places as public utilities.
The second subdivision includes gas, electricity, water, telephone, and telegraph companies. The common carriers could
also be placed here, as there is a certain amount of overlapping.
The fact that the government grants franchises and privileges
to these businesses does not make them public, because there
cannot be any grant unless they are public. They are all, more
or less, monopolies because they are more efficient that way.
This subdivision is open to extension. The extension should not
have to include only indispensable things, because the businesses
in this class have not always been as necessary as they are now.
At first they were luxuries and they may still be looked upon as
such. It is probable that extension may come not immediately
from private businesses but from those in the second class, those
not under the obligation to serve all. Gas companies were
recognized as public before the courts imposed upon them the
obligation to serve all.' 2
The third subdivision includes such businesses as grain
elevators, 13 stockyards, 14 and cotton gins.15 They were not
public in the beginning but have come to be so because of
public necessity and analogy to the historical public utilities.
The public necessity seems to be closely related to monopoly
and the welfare of a particular state or section of the country.
"1 Wyman, op. cit., supra note 6, at 18, Sec. 21.
"1 Wyman, op. cit., supra note 6, at 11, Sec. 12.
1
2The Paterson Gas Light Co. v. Brady, 27 N. J. L. 245, 72 Am. Dec.

370 (1858).

"Munn v. Ill., 94 U. S. 113 (1876); Budd v. N. Y., 143 U. S. 517
(1892);
Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 39 (1894).
2 4Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79 (1901);
Rateliff v. Wichita Union Stockyards Co., 74 Kans. 1, 86 Pac. 15o

(1906).

19 Chickasha Cotton Ol Co. v. Cotton County Gin Ca., 40 F. (2d) 846
(C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Tallassee 0i and Fertilizer Co. v. Holloway,
200 Ala. 492, 76 So. 434 (1917).
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This alone in the liberal view would be sufficient 6 for holding
the business public, but the conservative view requires an
analogy, also. Analogy and nothing else should never be sufficient. It is interesting to note that, when public utilities began
to branch out from the historical public callings, they were all
called common carriers. 17 This third subdivision is not recognized by the ultra-conservatives, who think that no others should
be added to those public utilities already existing.' 8
The second class, those businesses not obligated to serve
all, as yet contains only two businesses, insurance 9 and under
certain circumstances, milk dealers. 20 They are the only businesses not dependent upon a government franchise or not analogous to historic public callings to which price regulation has
been extended. Before the milk case the insurance case was
considered an anomaly in the law of price fixing,21 but now that
we have the milk case there is more possibility of extension in
this class. The whole matter is, in a most unpredictable state,
but there is the general conservative tendency to hold the business private and the general liberal tendency to follow the legislature in holding it public. The personnel of the Supreme
Court seems to be the most important single factor. There are
others which are more or less controlling: the helplessness of the
parties being protected, 22 relation to public health, 23 relation
to public credit, 24 failure of competition. Mr. Justice Stone's
18See Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Cotton County Gin Co., 40 F. (2d)
846, 849 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930).
.71 Wyman, op cit., supra note 6, at 18, Sec. 21.
IGerman Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 425 (1914)
(Dissenting opinion).
'German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (1913); McCarter v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 247, 73 Atl. 80 (1909).
"Nebbia v. N. Y., 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
"Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation With a Public Interest (1930),
39 Yale L. J. 1089, 1098-1099.
21"We are not judicially ignorant of what all human experience
teaches, that those so situated are peculiarly the prey of the unscrupulous and designing." J. Stone, dissenting opinion, Ribnick v. McBride,
277 U. S. 350, 361 (1928).
2 "The climate, which heightens
the need of ice for comfortable
and wholesome living, precludes resort to the natural product."
J. Brandeis, dissent, New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262, 287
(1932); "Milk is an essential item of diet." Nebbia v. N. Y., 291 U. S.
502, 516 (1934).
24-"On the other hand to the insured, insurance is an asset, a basis
4f credit. It is practically a necessity to business activity and enterprise." Germ. All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 414 (1914).
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statement about competition in his dissent to the Tyson case, 25
restated almost word for word in the dissent to the Ribnick
ease, 26 is broad enough to include the Nebbia ease and may be
taken as authority in the liberal view:
"An examination of the decisions of this Court in which price
regulation has been upheld will disclose that the element common to
all is the existence of a situation or a combination of circumstances
materially restricting the regulative force of competition so that buyers
or sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle
that serious economic consequences result to a very large number of
members of the community."

These are largely only generalities and probably not much more
satisfactory as tests than the phrase, "affected with a public
interest".
Should there be a class of public utilities not obligated to
serve all? Would it not be better to preserve what unity and
symetrical form there is in the public utility law? The Nebbia
case would still be decided the same way. Mr. Justice Roberts
recognized that there was such a form and that the dairy business was "not, in the accepted sense of the phrase, a public
utility." 27 The fact that Wyman considered that there was
a unity 28 should not necessarily have much weight thirty years
later; but if it would make the law simpler and not affect the
substance, that would be an advantage. This involves some discussion of police power. There is a difference of opinion as to
whether the power to regulate businesses as public utilities is a
part of police power or a separate power. 29 The writer thinks
that police power is the larger, of which the public utility power
is only a part, and that all the regulations imposed upon businesses because they are public come within the police power.
Those businesses which do not possess the obligation to serve all
should be regarded as being regulated because of the public
welfare of police power rather than because of the public interest
-273 U. S. 418, 438 (1927).
-277 U. S. 350, 360 (1928).
"Nebbia v. N. Y., 291 U. S. 502, 531 (1934).
8 1 Wyman, op. cit., supra, note 6, 32, at Sec. 39.
2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States (2nd Student's Ed., 1930), 752; 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.,
1927), 1300, Chapter XVI, "The Police Power of the States"; Burdick,
The American Constitution (1922) 568, Chapter XXXII, "Due Process
and the Police Power"; Freund, The Police Power (1904) 380, Chapter
XVIII, "Business Affected With a Public Interest".
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of public utilities.

This is one interpretation of the Nebbia case.

Mr. Justice Roberts, in discussing the Munn case, says:
"Thus understood, 'affected with a public interest' is the equivalent
of 'subject to the exercise of the police power'; and it ii plain that
nothing more was intended by the expression."*

Preserving the form of the law should be the very last thing
to be considered, but in this case it seems to have a lot to do with
the confusion of the whole subject. The commonly accepted
public utilities have to serve all, without discrimination, at a
reasonable price, and with adequate facilities. 3 1 It does not
follow that the imposition of one of these obligations-service
at a reasonable price-necessitates the imposition of the other
three, or that there can be price regulation of public utilities
only. The two businesses in the second class have been subjected to price regulation alone. Would it not greatly lessen
the confusion to say that price regulation alone has nothing to
do with a business' being a public utility but comes under the
police power altogether? It is understood that there would
still be the same difference of opinion as exists now under the
conservative and liberal views. The conservatives consider
32
affection with a public interest the only test for price fixing
and they have a very definite opinion of its interpretation. On
the other hand, Mr. Justice Holmes thinks that police power is
33
not broad enough.
In summary, public utilities under the obligation to serve all
are divided into three classes: (1) the historical public callings
accepted at the present time, (2) those operating under a government franchise, and (3) analogies to the historical which were
private to begin with and in addition to the analogy have a close
relation to the public. Businesses which" do not fall into these
classes are not under an obligation to serve all; and whatever
regulation they are subjected to, even price regulation, must come
only under the police power. Thus Nebbia v. New York is not
Nebbia v. N. Y., 291 U. S. 502, 533 (1934).
1 Wyman, op. cit., supra note 6, at 32, Sec. 39.
"By repeated decisions of this Court,... that phrase, however It
may be characterized, has become the established test by which the
legislative power to fix prices of commodities ... must be measured."
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 239 (1929).
""But* police power often is used In a wide sense to cover and, as
I said, to apologize for the general power of the legislature to make a
part of the community uncomfortable by a change." Tyson & Bro. v.
Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 446 (1927).
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a public utility case. It is submitted that its effect upon a classification of public utilities is to narrow that classification and
provide in the police power a much broader basis for price
regulation.
BETTIE GIBERT.

